| | | | | |  | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | IN
MARCH–APRIL 1998 we published an article in the Harvard Business Review entitled
"The Set-Up-to-Fail Syndrome: How Bosses Create Their Own Poor Performers."
The article seemed to hit a nerve and received enormous press coverage in the
United States, in Europe, and in Asia. Every journalist seemed to report a personal
story that illustrated the point we were making in the article. Many managers
wrote to us, from everywhere—we remember vividly a letter from two medical doctors
in Australia—to say, "I’ve seen what you describe, that’s exactly right!"
Some had been on the receiving end of the syndrome; others were bosses who were
suddenly understanding better their responsibility in their subordinates’ underperformance. | | | | | | | | That
response was of course very gratifying. It suggested that we had captured the
phenomenon in ways that people could relate to. | | | | | | | | Unexpectedly,
an HBS Press editor asked us whether we would consider writing a book on this
subject. We thought about it carefully, because we were not sure we had enough
to add to the original article. After all, we had been working on the subject
for years, and we had already researched it carefully. | | | | | | | | First
had come Jean-François’s intensive cross-sectional study of fifty superior-subordinate
dyads working in four manufacturing operations of Fortune 100 companies. The fifty
subordinates and their bosses were interviewed at least twice and completed a
questionnaire between the two interviews, in which the bosses evaluated the performance
of their subordinates and the subordinates described their bosses’ behavior toward
them. Jean-François had also interviewed many individuals working close
to these dyads and observed several meetings and interactions. In total, the study
involved close to four hundred hours of interviews and observations, 75 percent
of which were taped and later transcribed, providing a very rich base of information. | | | | | | | | We
had also been doing coaching and consulting work with many executives and their
teams of first reports, often including discussions of each individual’s 360-degree
feedback results. The setup-to-fail syndrome often manifests itself in 360-degree
feedback through bimodal results, so these assignments provided ample opportunities
to pursue our research on the subject. | | | | | | | | Last
but not least, by the time the article was published, we had discussed this subject
with over a thousand participants in executive development programs, testing with
them our ideas and interpretations, and asking them to volunteer and discuss their
experiences. These executives had come from all over the world and from every
level in their respective organizations, from junior to senior, from a single
company to mixed-company groups. In almost every group we had worked with, a few
participants had run up to us at the end of class to ask for individual meetings
to continue the discussion, explaining, "I just realized that’s what I’ve
been doing to some of my employees," or "You just helped me understand
what’s been happening between me and my second child," or "That’s exactly
what my boss has been putting me through." We did not keep track of the number
of such meetings we had over the years, but there were many. | | | | | | | | How
much more was there to learn, and what more could we say? With the benefit of
almost four years of additional work on the subject, the answer to both questions
has turned out to be a lot! | | | | | | | | We
have learned much from continued coaching and consulting work with executives
and executive teams. We have also discussed this subject with an additional two
thousand international executives taking part in development programs. We have
used these contacts to share our findings, of course, but also to keep looking
for new experiences, alternative explanations, and disconfirm-ing evidence. We
have also read a lot to try to understand better the psychological and social
mechanisms underlying our Syndrome. | | | | | | | | The
basic story has remained the same: We still believe that many bosses unwittingly
set up some of their subordinates to fail and, more generally, mismanage many
of the subordinates they regard as acceptable but lower-than-average performers.
But we now understand much better how and why managers do so. We also understand
better how subordinates contribute to a process that we initially attributed largely
to the bosses. We have learned much about what leaders can do to interrupt, and
better yet to prevent, the development of the syndrome. We have also devoted more
time to understanding the personal evolution some leaders went through to become
more effective with their perceived weaker performers. | | | | | | | | This
book is the result of over fifteen years of combined research on a subject that
we have cared deeply about because we have seen the human and performance toll
it takes on so many bosses and subordinates, not only in their professional lives
but also often in their personal lives as parents, spouses, and children. We have
also seen the set-up-to-fail syndrome in motion in other settings. Indeed, and
as a few of the examples in this book will show, the underlying mechanisms that
we describe can and do play equally powerful roles in other types of relationships,
at work (with peers, clients, suppliers, etc.) and beyond. | | | | | | | | Completing
a book is always a time of ambivalent feelings for authors. Competing with the
sense of relief and accomplishment is a desire to hang onto the book for a few
more days, "maybe just a week or two," to reexamine this or that tricky
part. But there comes a point where you have to let the child wander into the
world and make it on its own, and now is the time for this book. | | | | | | | | We
wrote this book to help people in positions of authority, particularly bosses,
become more effective in the management of their subordinates, particularly their
perceived weaker performers. We have had the good fortune to study a few bosses
who got great contributions from such employees and, at the same time, avoided
the human toll we have seen elsewhere so often. We have tried to understand what
they did differently from the majority of their peers, and we have tried to explain
it in ways that are actionable for managers—in other words, in ways concrete enough
for managers to be able to visualize what their behavior looks like in practice. | | | | | | | | It
is now time for us to stop writing, and—we hope—for you to start reading. Completing
this book does not signal the end of our interest in improving organizational
performance and quality of life at work. We will continue our work in this area,
and we hope some of you will share your reactions and experiences with us after
you read this book and, maybe, act on its content. | | | | | | | | Acknowledgments
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